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Abstract:
A process monitoring software tool has been developed, which allows inspectors a remote verification
of nuclear material movements based on the interpretation of neutron and gamma signals, which are
measured during the trajectory and online analysed. Neither supervision nor control is intended with
the software but a checking of the required coherency and conformity with safeguards purposes. The
data analysis and interpretation kernel supports the inspector in the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle
and allows in particular near real time accountancy in a reprocessing plant.
To monitor the nuclear material flow for near real time accountancy purposes a diagnostic aid for the
inspectorate was conceived, which interprets data from solution and powder measurements of
different kind and at different steps in the process.
In a first step tank transfers have been analysed by syntactic pattern recognition and introduction of
functional blocks. A predefined sequence of functional blocks yields a tank signature and
characterises unambiguously the filling rates, normal operation tank levels, levels for stirring and
skimming, and the emptying rates. In a second step the same approach has been applied to the cyclic
behaviour of a weighing scale. The weighing procedure with first scale-recalibration check, with the
filling of Pu powder cans and with the final inventory weight determination could be verified remotely.
Finally this syntactic pattern recognition approach has been applied to follow the movement of nuclear
material by treating the neutron and gamma signals.
This paper reports on the analysis of the neutron and gamma signals for the remote follow-up of the
spent fuel assemblies on their way to and from the measurement pit. A real-time analysis of the signal
from the neutron counter simultaneously to the signal of the gamma counter positioned under a fixed
geometry allows an identification of a movement signature. The functional blocks describing the
movement signature consist of peaks and plateau's. The auto-correlation of a predefined sequence
with the real sequence based on the measured neutron and gamma counts allows to characterise the
nuclear material moved in the channel towards and from the measurement pit. With the appropriate
parameters such as peak height and plateau length the software monitors if the material movement
procedure is followed conform to the safeguards purposes.
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1. Introduction
Process monitoring is an excellent tool to verify
absences of undeclared activities or
anomalities in industrial or semi-industrial
processes. A software tool has been
developed upon request of the Euratom
inspectorate to monitor in real time the nuclear
material (NM) flow of about twice 850 tons/yr
through the whole PUREX process in UP2 and
UP3 for the spent fuel of power reactors at the
La Hague site. The about 800 kg of Pu
2processed per month through each line are for
safeguards purposes measured accurately
(with an error less than 1%, corresponding to
less than 8 kg per month). However it is not
satisfying to verify just the interim inventory,
because it only identifies an eventual problem
without any localisation in place and time and
without any indication of the reason. Therefore
it is needed to monitor the complete material
flow, while surveying if the spent fuel batch is
processed following the declared flow sheets
and complying with the safeguards
requirements on material losses. The
monitoring includes:
· the status of health check
· the surveillance through gamma/ neutron
counters for the displacement of nuclear
material
· the NM liquid inventory follow-up through
level and density measurements for the
transfers between tanks,
· the NM powder inventory follow-up through
the weighing scale signal for the final filling
of recipients with the Pu powder product.
It especially verifies for Near Real Time
Accountancy purposes the coherency with
safeguards purposes and conformity in
procedure.
2. Structure of the monitoring
software
2.1. Data acquisition with a data
historian
 Process industries commonly work with a
superposition of different acquisition systems.
The data over a large time period, are usually
collected in a first time-series database of non-
relational type and compressed by a data
historian, that allows fast real-time access to
the significant reported data. The reported data
are analysed and the results are exported in a
second database of relational type.
Each significant signal variation has to be
unambiguously detected with time and date
stamp. The data historian either filters out data
points at relatively large time intervals in case
of no or constant variation of the signal (e.g.
the auto regressive moving average filter) or
the historian reports exceptions (exceeding the
specified compression deviation blanket).
The software developed for solution monitoring
was not intended to duplicate the operation of
a data historian and therefore neither serves to
compress nor to filter the original data but
utilises the commercially available data
historians such as Osisoft PI [1] or the
Matrikon OPC [2].
2.2. Monitoring of a batch process by
the Data Analysis and Interpretation
(DAI) software
2.2.1 Data analysis & interpretation concept
As the nuclear material of the spent fuel is
processed in batch mode or even in
continuous mode, a certain cyclic behaviour in
the measured signal profile can be observed.
However the profiles of the measured signals
in this large industrial plant is not strictly
periodical and therefore no standard pattern
recognition algorithms can be applied as such.
The innovative algorithm in the software is to
detect the predefined elementary functional
behaviours in the signal. These functional
behaviours represent in a small block one
function in the process cycle. The process
cycle can be defined as a sequence of events
with certain functions. The specific task of the
software is to interpret the recorded points of
the data historian and to detect the different
events by recognising the sequential functional
behaviours with an accurate identification of
the start and end of those functional
behaviours.
 The innovative aspect is that the data
interpretation is done on the following abstract
level:
· each typical process cycle is modelled by
composing series of succeeding functional
behaviour blocks, and
· the analysis is completely performed in a
symbolic way by evaluating the sequence
of functional behaviour blocks.
 As the NM monitoring has to operate
efficiently, the analysis includes also all basic
information of the plant design and of the
procedure for each reprocessing step. The
functional behaviour, that is associated to the
measured signal, is online compared with the
possible functional behaviours, that are
predefined in the plant design.
To analyse the evolution of the signal in time,
an observation window moves from one data
point to the next and calculates for each point
the average of the signal variation over the
time with the data point values, just before and
after the window. This characterises each data
point with a mean variation, which allows the
detection of the start of a new functional
behaviour by comparing with the predefined
variations with lower and upper limits. A
detailed description is given in [3].
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 2.2.2 Cross-correlation
 
To facilitate finding out the correlated signals a
status code is introduced to associated
functional behaviour with the following rules:
· all potentially correlated signals are
marked by a change in status code of the
associated functional behaviour from
passive to ready
· a significant signal variation for a ready
functional behaviour changes its status
into active if no additional requirements
have to be fulfilled
· a significant signal variation for a ready
functional behaviour changes its status
into checking in case of additional
requirements and passes finally to active if
all requirements are fulfilled.
The DAI kernel evaluates all correlated
functional behaviours, which are
simultaneously in an active mode. By means of
cross-correlation the comprehensiveness
between the active correlated functional
behaviours is checked and coherency with
safeguards purposes verified.
 
 2.2.3 Auto-correlation
 
The repetition of a certain process cycle is
recognised as the looping of a sequence of
functional behaviours. This looping is
controlled by means of auto-correlation, this
means that the completeness of a cycle is
verified by comparing with the predefined
design. Errors, such as incompleteness of the
cycle, inadvertent repetition of a functional
behaviour, or falling out of a part of the
process cycle, are reported with a diagnosis on
the global constraint violation.
3. DAI application on the neutron &
gamma signals
3.1 The fuel insertion process step
 
 All the spent fuel (SF) assemblies with their
declared characterisation are at receipt roughly
checked by total weighing and passive neutron
counting before storing in the spent fuel pool.
Before entering the process a second more
accurate check is foreseen with the burn-up
detector. The first process step can be
localised in the input cell for the fuel insertion
with the burn-up check. Thereby the fuel is
taken from the pool and moved inwards the
measuring pit, moved backwards and tilted for
introducing in the chopping channel. To follow
the fuel movement in the input cell a neutron
counter and gamma spectrometer are placed
at the entrance of the chopping channel. The
different movements of the spent fuel
assembly in the input cell are presented in
Fig.1. (a-b-c-d-e-f-g-h).
 With the data historian the neutron and gamma
signals are collected and compressed. A
homothetic scaling is applied to standardise
the signal range and to feed the DAI software
with clear cyclic signals.
 
 Fig.1a: SF from pool Fig.1b: SF transport
 
 Fig.1c: SF towards pit Fig.1d: SF in meas. pit
 
 
 Fig.1e: SF withdrawal Fig.1f: SF tilting
 
4 
 Fig.1g: insert chopper Fig.1h: reset
3.2 The neutron/gamma cyclic signals
in the input cell
 
 Both signals, gamma and neutron that are
reported by the data historian are analysed
and interpreted simultaneously by DAI.
 Two typical cycles, rescaled by the data
historian, are presented in Fig. 2. The neutron
and gamma signal behave in a similar way, but
the presence of both with the given scale are
characterising the real spent fuel composition.
During the SF movement from the SF storage
pool to the measurement pit, the SF
approaches differently the detectors. As soon
as the fuel is entering the solid angles of
respectively the gamma and neutron detectors,
the count rate directly goes up to a certain
plateau, which is specific for the isotopic
content of the spent fuel pellets in the Zirkaloy
cladding. The waiting of the fuel in the loading
machine before the start of the movement
does not alter the registration in the solid angle
of the detectors and thus gives an almost
constant count rate. As soon as the fuel is
approaching the detector by horizontal
displacement a steep increase in signal is
observed.
 Once the fuel is descending in the
measurement pit a very fast change in count
rate is observed. The head and end of the
spent fuel pins are of stainless steel and under
the long-term irradiation Co-60 isotopes are
present. The passing by of the head/end of a
fuel leads to significant increases in count rate
of the detectors and explains the first peak of
Fig. 2. Once the fuel is completely in the
measurement pit, zero counts are recorded.
The number of counts increases again very
fast when the fuel is moved out of the
measurement pit, especially a second peak is
recorded when the head/end is passing by the
detectors. Then the fuel is tilted from its
vertical position to a horizontal position in order
to enter the chopping channel. At about 45°
tilted position the head/end of fuel is passing
closely at the gamma counter and this is
recognised by the third peak in Fig. 2. Finally
the fuel is inserted in the chopping channel
and this is registered with the second plateau,
at another level than the first one because the
detectors have a different view on the fuel in
the horizontal position.
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Fig. 2: Scaled n/gamma signal typically returned by the data historian for two consecutive cyclic input
operations on the SF.
53.3 Symbolic modeling with the DAI
software for automatic recognition of
the neutron/gamma cycles
 
 A fuel in the loading machine waiting an OK for
movement can be identified with a plateau
whereas a horizontal or vertical displacement
or even a tilting of the spent fuel assembly is
characterised with a steep slope. This is
modelled with three normal kinds of functional
behaviour:
q increasing slope with unknown value,
q decreasing slope with unknown value,
q plateau with unknown value.
 For the detailed definition of these functional
behaviours the reader is referred to the DAI
user manual [4].
 To analyse the signal for one cycle three
subregions are indicated:
 The first part concerns the displacement of the
fuel in vertical position; The second part
concerns the tilting of the fuel and the third part
covers the insertion of the fuel into the
chopping channel.
 The symbolic model for one loop of the cyclic
gamma/neutron signal is given in Fig. 3. A
waiting time after the tilting is allowed in the
model by the optional “plateau after decreasing
slope” functional behaviour that can be
bypassed. A synchronisation point has been
introduced in the model after the insertion in
the chopping channel. This has been selected
by the modeller on a free basis at the end of
the cycle to anticipate difficulties in addressing
the complete loop and to allow resetting of the
analysis for the next loop.
 The fine tuning of all parameters for all
functional behaviours was done with all
available neutron /gamma signals, in particular
the deviations of the standard signal, as shown
in Figs. 4 and 5.
 
 
            Fig. 4: Neutron and gamma signal for first
            case of common anomality: repeated (two)
            measurements in the pit before the approval
            for insertion in the chopping channel
 
 
 Fig. 5: Neutron and gamma signal for second
type of anomaly with absence of the second
part, because the spent fuel is only moved
from pool to measurement and back and is
not inserted in the chopping channel.
 
 
 3.4 Final application: inspector tool for
automatic follow-up of the spent fuel in
the input cell.
 
 This application example of DAI on the
neutron-gamma signal allows the inspector to
monitor the nuclear material of the SF into the
chopping channel and after a more detailed
characterisation of the SF with the burnup
detector in the measurement pit. In view of the
Near Real Time Accountancy a diagnostic
support for the inspectors is in direct use with
this DAI software. This application illustrates
how the DAI software can utilise the described
algorithms of cross- and auto-correlation and
the formalisms of symbolising the signal profile
and of assigning a status to an event in a
generic way.
 The displacement of the fuel from the storage
pool into the chopping channel is correlated
with the burnup characterisation of this SF
assembly. The coherence in nuclear material
flow further down in the process with the
burnup signature can be verified in real time
and each error is alarmed with a diagnosis
(inclusive the necessary messages and early
warnings). Moreover, the conformity of the
consecutive actions in the fuel insertion
process step with the prescribed model is
evaluated in an efficient and transparent way.
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Fig. 3: Model for the cyclic neutron/gamma signal
 Thanks to the pragmatic use of all on-line
experience with the process, especially the
vast amount of neutron/gamma signals, the
monitoring system is tailored with a minimum
of disabilities in the recognition of a cycle and
a maximum of transparency. Those anomalies,
which are no longer transparent, are due to the
need of a higher level diagnosis, which is not
envisaged with this process monitoring tool.
The appearance of these anomalies is rare
and neglecting them is acceptable according to
Howell [5].
 With the other applications, on the tank
level/density for solution transfers as reported
in [6], and on the weighing scale for the
powder quantification as reported in [7], this
application also demonstrates the general
concept and modular structure of the DAI
programme, that allows the analysis of very
different kind of signals.
4. Conclusion
4.1 Results
A stand-alone software tool, that monitors the
nuclear material flow for the different process
steps, is successfully implemented at UP2 and
UP3 facilities of the La Hague Reprocessing
Plant and in operation under the so-called
“System 7” application by the Euratom
inspectorate. In a reprocessing plant the
signals for each process step, such as the
spent fuel insertion process step as addressed
in detail here, are not only interpreted with
identification of all functional behaviours but
also evaluated carefully concerning the
integrity of the material flow from and to the
neighbouring places. Both coherence in
material flow and conformity with the
prescribed safeguards procedure are analysed
and for each error an alarm and a diagnosis is
given. A precise follow-up of the functional
behaviour and of the sequence of behaviours
allows a precise accounting of the mass of
nuclear materials at the key measurement
point in a material balance area.
The tool serves the inspector as a verification
means for coupling the displace spent fuel
assembly with its burnup signature. At each
point, where an anomaly is detected, the cycle
is interrupted. The tool then lists all possible
procedural errors or constraint violations. It is
left to the inspector to decide on the real
cause, to remain consistent with their defined
responsibility in the follow-up of the process.
The tool is setup in a generic way, so that it
can be applied for very different type of
signals, such as the isotopic at different sites.
Moreover this example demonstrates the
usefulness of a simplified approach to follow-
up the complete transfer of different material
flows, in which all functional blocks of the
design have been successfully validated.
4.2 Perspectives
The EURATOM inspectorate has asked to
implement a similar monitoring tool at the
reprocessing plant of Sellafield (THORP). The
software has also been selected by the IAEA
for the solution monitoring of the TETRA
7demonstration plant by the Japanese
inspectors of NMCC, and for the inspection of
the Tokai reprocessing plant (TRP) by IAEA
itself. Apart from safeguards inspections the
tool can be applied as a batch norm monitoring
system (ISA-88 and ISA-95). The batch
industry is still finalising the last ISA-95 norm
to enhance the Material Flow Management
and the traceability in Manufacturing Executing
System (MES).
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